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The potential economic effects of
the allocation of cadaveric kidneys on the basis of
tissue-matching criteria are controversial. We ana-
lyzed the economic costs associated with the trans-
plantation of cadaveric kidneys with various num-
bers of HLA mismatches and examined the potential
economic benefits of a local, as compared with a na-
tional, system designed to minimize HLA mismatch-





All data were supplied by the U.S. Renal
Data System. Data on all payments made by Medi-
care from 1991 through 1997 for the care of recipi-
ents of a first cadaveric renal transplant were ana-
lyzed according to the number of HLA-A, B, and DR
mismatches between donor and recipient and the




Average Medicare payments for renal-
transplant recipients in the three years after trans-
plantation increased from $60,436 per patient for fully
HLA-matched kidneys (those with no HLA-A, B, or
DR mismatches) to $80,807 for kidneys with six HLA
mismatches between donor and recipient, a differ-
ence of 34 percent (P<0.001). By three years after
transplantation, the average Medicare payments were
$64,119 for transplantations of kidneys with less than
12 hours of cold-ischemia time and $74,997 for those
with more than 36 hours (P<0.001). In simulations,
the assignment of cadaveric kidneys to recipients by
a method that minimized HLA mismatching within a
local geographic area (i.e., within one of the approx-
imately 50 organ-procurement organizations, which
cover widely varying geographic areas) produced the
largest cost savings ($4,290 per patient over a period
of three years) and the largest improvements in the
graft-survival rate (2.3 percent) when the potential




Transplantation of better-matched ca-
daveric kidneys could have substantial economic ad-
vantages. In our simulations, HLA-based allocation
of kidneys at the local level produced the largest esti-
mated cost savings, when the duration of cold ische-
mia was taken into account. No additional savings
were estimated to result from a national allocation
program, because the additional costs of longer cold-
ischemia time were greater than the advantages of
optimizing HLA matching. (N Engl J Med 1999;341:
1440-6.)
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HE debate about the value of HLA match-
ing in renal transplantation continues. Large
retrospective studies have shown the poten-
tial for clear improvements in graft survival





study of mandatory national assignment of cadaveric
kidneys to recipients with no HLA antigen mismatch-




An expanded policy of assigning cadaveric kidneys to
recipients with whom there are no HLA mismatches
(i.e., no HLA-A, B, or DR antigen mismatches), re-
gardless of geographic region, has been implemented,
but further expansion of the requirement for national
assignment of kidneys to recipients with whom there
is some degree of HLA mismatching has met strong
resistance.
The current allocation policy of the United Net-
work for Organ Sharing (UNOS) favors better match-
ing of kidneys and recipients with some degree of
HLA incompatibility on the local level (i.e., within
one of the approximately 50 organ-procurement or-
ganizations, which cover widely varying geographic
areas), but it does not directly discourage transplan-
tation when the most donor–recipient mismatches are
present — that is, mismatches of five or six HLA anti-
gens. Only a national system of allocation could mini-
mize HLA mismatches in all cases. The current nation-
al scheme for assigning cadaveric kidneys to recipients
with whom there are no HLA mismatches, regardless
of the geographic region, increases the duration of
cold ischemia (the time from donation to transplan-
tation). Increasing cold-ischemia time might decrease
graft survival and increase costs if a national alloca-
tion system were implemented. In addition, strategies
to minimize HLA mismatching might further skew
the racial distribution of transplants toward whites and
away from members of minority groups, thus raising
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Throughout the debate and study of this issue, lit-
tle information has been available on the economic
implications of HLA matching. Gjertson et al. argued
that a savings of approximately $1,000 per patient
could be realized by five years after transplantation
if cadaveric kidneys were allocated nationally on the





 However, their economic calculations
were based on a model of the cost of return to di-
alysis, graft removal, and transportation of organs.
Data on actual expenses for the care of transplant re-
cipients were not available for their calculations.
We undertook an analysis of the actual medical ex-
penses associated with different levels of HLA mis-
matching in cadaveric renal transplantation. These
expenses include the cost of the transplantation, in-
cluding the postoperative medical care and immuno-
suppression, and the cost of dialysis in patients whose
grafts fail. Using UNOS registry data linked to Medi-
care claims and payment data, we calculated the aver-
age Medicare payments associated with various degrees
of HLA mismatching between donor and recipient.
Average Medicare payments associated with increasing
cold-ischemia times were also calculated. These figures
were combined in simulations to generate estimates of
the economic ramifications of HLA-based methods of











 a joint effort of the National Institute of Diabetes and
Digestive and Kidney Diseases and the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA). The system was designed to collect, an-
alyze, and distribute descriptive data on end-stage renal disease in
the United States, including prevalence, treatment methods, sur-
vival, and costs of care. The USRDS provided us with records for
all transplantations performed in the United States and recorded
in the UNOS renal-transplantation registry. The USRDS linked the
UNOS registry to HCFA billing and payment records for the
Medicare system. This linkage made possible the analysis both of
the characteristics and outcomes of renal-transplant recipients and
of the charges and payments for the medical services provided to
them. Because 92.5 percent of all payments for medical services
for patients with end-stage renal disease are from Medicare, pay-




it was possible to examine the clinical outcomes associated with
characteristics of donors, recipients, and protocols for nearly ev-
ery renal transplantation performed in the United States and to
determine the actual costs to Medicare associated with the out-
comes. Changes in organ-allocation policy would presumably af-
fect all recipients of cadaveric organs, regardless of their health care
coverage. Therefore, no exclusions based on health care coverage
were made. The economic analysis presented here focuses on the
expected effect of a change in allocation policy on average costs
to Medicare for all transplantations of cadaveric kidneys in the
United States.
 
Determination of HLA Matching
 
The algorithm we used to calculate the number of HLA mis-
matches is that currently used by UNOS to determine the extent of
HLA mismatching for organ allocation. An HLA mismatch exists
when a donor’s HLA-A, B, or DR antigen does not match the
recipient’s corresponding HLA-A, B, or DR antigen. Numbers of
HLA mismatches were calculated on the basis of UNOS coding.
 
Theoretical Distribution of Organs
 
Estimates of the local and national distributions of cadaveric kid-
neys for transplantation according to the number of HLA mis-
matches that might result from a system designed to ensure minimal





simulated distributions of organs were chosen because the esti-
mated national proportion of kidneys allocated to recipients with
no HLA mismatches agreed with the figures reported by UNOS
for cadaveric kidney transplantations in 1996. UNOS reported





 and Takemoto et al. estimated that a rate




The simulated local distribution of organs was designed to rep-
resent allocation within an organ-procurement organization, which
may cover an area from part of a large city to several states, and
was based on a pool of 750 recipients. The pool for the simulated
national distribution was made up of 5000 recipients. Although





 a pool of 5000 was chosen, according to Takemoto
et al., “to take into account the ‘friction’ in a national waiting list




The simulations of Takemoto et al. showed the potential of a
strategy of minimizing HLA mismatches at either the local or the
national level to reduce the degree of mismatching from that




 The current system of al-
locating kidneys grants points to a donor–recipient pair for cer-




 Points are also
granted for other factors. The organ is assigned to the donor–
recipient pair with the most total points. The strategy of minimiz-
ing mismatching that we used in our simulations involves first
identifying the set of recipients with the fewest HLA mismatches
with a given donor organ. For example, for a given organ, the
fewest mismatches possible might be three, and there might be
several possible recipients for that organ with three mismatches.
The organ would then be assigned to one of these recipients on
the basis of the factors other than HLA matching that are cur-
rently used in the point system. The current system considers
HLA matching and other factors simultaneously. By emphasizing
mismatches before other factors and by taking into account more
than two HLA mismatches, a system based on minimal HLA mis-
matching could much more effectively avoid transplantations with
high numbers of mismatches.
According to current policy regarding local and national allo-
cations, kidneys were assumed to be assigned to recipients with no
HLA mismatches throughout the nation. The proportion of
transplantations that involved donor–recipient pairs with no HLA
mismatches was determined by actual experience with the current
national allocation policy. We made adjustments to the estimates
of local distribution made by Takemoto et al. so as to incorporate
the current rate of transplantation of kidneys with no HLA mis-






Average cumulative costs were calculated according to a gener-





information-preserving method that incorporates data on patients
with incomplete follow-up by systematically accounting for the
censoring of observations at the time of the last known follow-up.
The incremental addition to cumulative costs on any given day is
the average cost on that day for the patients followed up to that
point. For example, the addition to average cumulative costs on
day 365 is simply the average of the costs incurred on day 365 by
patients with 365 days of follow-up. Sequentially summing these
average daily costs produces estimates of the average cost of care
over time while conserving all available information. Patients were
included in the analysis from the day of transplantation to the last
follow-up contact or death. Therefore, this method includes all
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costs to Medicare of medical care — including, for example, hos-
pitalization for transplantation, acute rejection, or infection; re-




Measuring significance levels associated with average cumula-
tive costs is difficult, because of the complex nature of the calcu-
lations involved. Mathematically derived standard errors are not
available for the information measured in this case. Bootstrap
methods produce very accurate estimates of error and confidence





 Statistics of interest generated by the resampling pro-
vide information about the distribution of the variable being es-
timated. It is often suggested that 1000 bootstrap replications are





performed 2000 bootstrap replications for each analysis.
Graft survival was estimated with the Kaplan–Meier method,




 Differences were consid-






All patients recorded in the UNOS registry (dis-





) as undergoing renal transplantation from 1991
through 1997 were initially included in the analysis.
We excluded recipients of transplants from living do-
nors, those who received multiorgan transplants, and
those with missing information on HLA matching.
Patients who received first transplants before 1991
were also excluded. A total of 27,050 patients re-
mained in the analysis of the effects of HLA match-
ing. Among these patients, the duration of cold is-




Average cumulative Medicare payments for patients
receiving transplants with zero to six HLA mismatches
are shown in Figure 1. As expected, transplantations
involving no HLA mismatches were associated with
the lowest average Medicare payments ($60,436 at
three years), and those involving six HLA mismatches
with the highest payments ($80,807 at three years,
P<0.001). Average Medicare payments through three
years after transplantation and three-year graft-sur-
vival rates are presented in Table 1. From zero to six
HLA mismatches, the total cost increased by $20,371,
or 34 percent.
The reduction in the graft-survival rate from trans-
plantations involving no HLA mismatches to those
involving six was 11 percent (P<0.001). The most
pronounced effect of increased HLA mismatching on
graft survival, a decrease of 4 percent, occurred from
zero to one mismatch (P<0.001). However, the most
pronounced economic effect of increased HLA mis-
matching was the 12 percent increase from five to six
mismatches, representing an increase of $8,692 in cost
(P<0.001). The difference in cost between five and
six HLA mismatches accounts for 43 percent of the
total difference between zero and six mismatches.
The percentages of transplantations involving var-
ious numbers of HLA mismatches are shown in Ta-
ble 1. The actual distribution of numbers of HLA




The simulated local system for the allocation of or-
gans shifted the number of mismatches involved in
most transplantations from four, five, or six to one
or two. The larger pool of recipients used for the sim-
ulated national allocation system generated further
improvement in the distribution of HLA mismatches;
the result was more transplantations involving one
mismatch and fewer involving two or three mismatch-
es, as compared with the simulated local distribution.
The average expected cost savings from a policy
ensuring that transplantations involved the fewest
possible HLA mismatches, assuming no effects due
to differences in cold-ischemia time, was calculated
as the difference between the weighted average cost
of transplantations according to the actual distribu-
tion and that according to the simulated distribu-
tions. The average expected cost savings amounted
to $4,290 for the simulated local distribution and
$4,768 for the simulated national distribution. Sim-
ilarly, the average expected increase in the rate of
graft survival, assuming no effects due to differences
in cold-ischemia time, was 2.3 percent for the sim-
ulated local distribution and 2.7 percent for the sim-
ulated national distribution.
 
Duration of Cold Ischemia
 
Average cumulative Medicare payments through
three years after transplantation are shown in Figure
2 according to the duration of cold ischemia. A reg-
ular increase in cost is apparent as cold-ischemia time
increases. By three years after transplantation, the av-
erage Medicare payments were $64,119 for transplan-
tations involving less than 12 hours of cold ischemia
and $74,997 for those involving more than 36 hours
of cold ischemia (P<0.001). The economic effect of
the duration of cold ischemia was similar for trans-
plantations involving different levels of HLA match-
ing, including those with no HLA mismatches.
The effects of the duration of cold ischemia on
cost and graft survival at three years are presented in
Table 2. To calculate the average increase in Medi-
care payments for an increase of one hour in cold-
ischemia time, the difference in average Medicare
payments from one group of patients to another was
divided by the difference in the average number of
hours of cold ischemia. On the basis of these calcu-
lations, we then determined that the weighted aver-
age cost associated with an increase of one hour of
cold ischemia through three years after transplanta-
tion was $290. Thus, an additional 10 hours of cold
ischemia would be expected to raise the average cost
of transplantation at three years by $2,900. On the
basis of weighted averages, the effect of an increase
of one hour of cold ischemia was a reduction of 0.3
percent in graft survival at three years.
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Comparisons of Allocation Schemes
 
The implications of the allocation of cadaveric re-
nal kidneys according to the methods used in our
simulations, in terms of average graft-survival rates and
average cost savings to Medicare, are shown in Table
3. The effects of such a system of allocation include
both the potential benefits of reallocation in terms
of better HLA matching and the additional cold-
ischemia time necessitated by shipping kidneys to
other regions of the country. The actual average re-
corded duration of cold ischemia for kidneys trans-
planted locally was 19 hours, as compared with 24
hours for kidneys transported on the basis of nation-
al allocation. The calculations of the potential effects
of a national allocation system were based on the as-
sumption that an average of five additional hours of
cold ischemia would be required. Graft survival and
cost with the national allocation scheme were also
calculated for 0 and 10 additional hours of cold is-
chemia for comparative purposes. The potential ef-
fects of local allocation according to a system designed
to minimize HLA mismatches were calculated, on
the assumption that there would be no increase in
cold ischemia. Although it is unlikely that reallocation
at the local level would increase cold-ischemia time for
the average transplantation, cost calculations were also
made with one and two additional hours assumed,
for comparative purposes. The results were calculated
as the potential savings associated with a given allo-
cation system minus the number of additional hours
of cold ischemia multiplied by the average cost of
one additional hour.
The results of our calculations suggest that a strat-
egy of national allocation of cadaveric kidneys that
was designed to minimize HLA mismatching would
generate the largest improvement in graft survival and
the largest cost savings if there were no effects on the
duration of cold ischemia. However, longer preser-
vation times would be necessary under a national al-
location policy. Our model predicted that a policy of
local allocation aimed at ensuring minimal HLA mis-
matching would generate the greatest improvement
in graft survival and the greatest cost savings once
cold-ischemia time was taken into account; the aver-
age graft-survival rate would increase by 2.3 percent,




 Average Cumulative Medicare Payments for Patients Receiving Cadaveric Renal Transplants, According to the Number of
HLA Mismatches.
The absence of HLA mismatches was associated with the lowest average Medicare payments ($60,436 at three years), and six HLA
mismatches were associated with the highest average Medicare payments ($80,807 at three years, P<0.001 for the comparison
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after transplantation. National allocation according to
this strategy would improve average graft survival by
1.2 percent and would save Medicare an average of
$3,318 per transplant recipient by three years after
transplantation, given the expected increase of five
hours in the duration of cold ischemia. For purposes
of comparison, the local system of allocation with
minimal HLA mismatching would produce results
similar to those of the national scheme if the local













The results of our simulations suggest that the ex-
tent of HLA mismatching is an important determi-
nant of Medicare expenditures associated with renal
transplantation. Much like the effect of HLA mis-




 the effect of HLA mis-
matching on costs is not constant over the range
from zero to six mismatches. The benefit of reduced
HLA mismatching, in terms of graft survival, is most
pronounced when there are no HLA-antigen mis-
matches; however, the effect of mismatching on costs
 
*Plus–minus values are means ±SE. Because of rounding, percentages
do not always total 100.




 Data from simulated local and nation-
al allocation systems are based on a model in which it was assumed that there

























































































































































0 14 14 14 60,436±756 83±1.0
1 3 24 45 63,569±1,044 79±1.0
2 11 44 35 64,853±565 78±0.7
3 23 18 5 66,584±417 77±0.6
4 25 1 1 71,031±461 74±0.5
5 16 0 0 72,115±571 74±0.6




 Average Cumulative Medicare Payments for Patients Receiving Cadaveric Renal Transplants, According to the Duration of
Cold Ischemia.
By three years after transplantation, the average Medicare payments were $64,119 for transplantations involving less than 12 hours

































30 to 36 HoursG
24 to <30 HoursG
12 to <24 HoursG
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is most pronounced when there are six mismatches.
The economic effect of using kidneys with six as com-
pared with five HLA mismatches accounts for 43
percent of the total difference in cost between trans-
plantations involving zero mismatches and those in-
volving six mismatches.
Although there is a clear potential to save money
through better HLA matching, higher costs are also
associated with increasing cold-ischemia time. The
costs associated with longer preservation limit the
likelihood that any national scheme for the alloca-
tion of cadaveric kidneys can realize the full benefits
of better HLA matching. Although cost savings and
better graft survival may result from any move to im-
prove the degree of HLA matching, better local
matching (within organ-procurement organizations)
is likely to have better results than a national alloca-
tion scheme. Our simulations demonstrate that better
matching at the local level would produce the largest
cost savings and the greatest benefit in terms of graft
survival when cold-ischemia time is taken into ac-
count. This conclusion is further supported by the
fact that organizational and organ-transportation costs
were excluded from the analysis presented here, which





sumed that organizational and shipping costs in a
national system of allocation would average approx-




 The inclusion of
estimated shipping costs in our calculations would
have reduced further the relative economic benefit
of national, as compared with local, allocation. Al-
though the actual magnitude of these costs is uncer-
tain, they would have to be considered before a na-
tional allocation system could be implemented.
The cost associated with longer cold ischemia
times was a critical factor in this analysis. Ten hours
of cold ischemia costs Medicare an average of $2,900
and reduces graft-survival rates by 3 percent at three
years after transplantation. This observation has im-
portant implications for health care policy. Is it nec-
essary to have average cold-ischemia times of 19 hours
for transplants locally distributed and 24 hours for
those shared nationally? Numerous strategies might
be used to reduce the length of preservation, such
as giving transplantation procedures priority in the
assignment of operating rooms and other hospital
resources and using chartered flights when organs
are shipped. Approximately 8000 transplantations of
cadaveric kidneys are performed each year in the
United States; the annual savings to Medicare from
every hour by which the average cold-ischemia time
is reduced is therefore approximately $2.3 million.
The economic benefits of the local allocation of
kidneys according to a system designed to minimize
HLA mismatching result predominantly from avoid-
ing transplantation involving the highest numbers of
mismatches. By far the most expensive transplanta-
tions are those with six HLA mismatches, but trans-
plantations involving four or five HLA mismatches
are also markedly more expensive than those involving
three or fewer HLA mismatches. Much of the eco-
nomic benefit of a system of local allocation designed
to minimize HLA mismatching could be achieved
by a policy that limited transplantations of highly mis-
matched grafts.
Numerous issues remain to be addressed. If a re-
design of the organ-allocation system is to be consid-
ered, it is important to consider equity in the result-
ing distribution of organs. Adjustments to the present
scheme may alter the degree of preference currently
given to children, highly immune-sensitized patients,
patients with long waiting times, and patients who
have served as donors for others. Excessive focus on
HLA matching has been implicated in the apparent





















































































<12 hr 11 8 64,119±660 — 78±0.5
12 to <24 hr 49 18 67,054±311 294 76±0.3
24 to <30 hr 20 27 70,421±508 374 74±0.6
30 to 36 hr 12 33 70,638±680 43 74±0.8
>36 hr 8 43 74,997±852 436 70±1.0
*Data for the current system are from 1996. Costs and graft-survival
rates are at three years.
†The negative number indicates a decrease in graft survival; others indi-
cate increases.
TABLE 3. PREDICTED COST SAVINGS TO MEDICARE AND CHANGES 
IN GRAFT SURVIVAL WITH REVISED NATIONAL AND LOCAL 
ALLOCATION SYSTEMS BASED ON MINIMAL HLA MISMATCHING, 














National 0 2.7 4,768
5 1.2 3,318
10 ¡0.3 1,868
Local 0 2.3 4,290
1 2.0 4,000
2 1.7 3,710
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Another issue to be considered is who is to benefit
from any cost savings that are generated. Consider-
ing that 8000 renal transplantations are performed
each year in the United States, a local system of
allocation of kidneys to ensure minimal HLA mis-
matching has the potential to save Medicare a total
of $34 million through three years after transplanta-
tion. Our model projects that this sum will increase
in later years. One potential use of the money saved
would be to cover the cost of maintenance immuno-
suppression. Medicare coverage of immunosuppres-
sion ends three years after transplantation. If a new
organ-allocation policy is implemented, a portion of
any savings that is generated can be used to extend
the duration of this coverage.
For many reasons, policy makers are moving to-
ward a more national scheme of allocation. In this
time of increasing financial pressure on our medical
system, such a redesign should be undertaken with
the understanding that — because of the detrimental
effects of the longer cold-ischemia time that is likely
in a national allocation scheme — the economic
benefits resulting from greater HLA matching are
most readily available at the local level. Ignoring this
fact may make an already imperfect system worse.
We are indebted to Ray R. White, who provided the code on which
the HLA-matching algorithm was based; to Ann Harper, who provid-
ed documentation of UNOS policy; and to other members of the
UNOS staff, without whose assistance this study would not have been
possible. The calculations and opinions in this article are those of the
authors, and not of UNOS or the UNOS staff. In addition, the in-
terpretation and reporting of the data supplied by the USRDS are
the responsibility of the authors and should in no way be seen as re-
flecting the official policy or interpretation of the U.S. government.
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